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Abstract
Privacy preservation and the protection of speech data is in high
demand, not least as a result of recent regulation, e.g. the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the EU. While there
has been a period with which to prepare for its implementation,
its implications for speech data is poorly understood. This as-
sertion applies to both the legal and technology communities,
and is hardly surprising since there is no universal definition of
‘privacy’, let alone a clear understanding of when or how the
GDPR applies to the capture, storage and processing of speech
data. In aiming to initiate the discussion that is needed to estab-
lish a level of harmonisation that is thus far lacking, this con-
tribution presents some reflections of both legal and technology
communities on the implications of the GDPR as regards speech
data. The article outlines the need for taxonomies at the in-
tersection of speech technology and data privacy—a discussion
that is still very much in its infancy—and describes the ways to
safeguards and priorities for future research. In being agnostic
to any specific application, the treatment should be of interest
to the speech communication community at large.
Index Terms: privacy, speech, data protection, GDPR
1. Introduction
On the surface, the concept of privacy may appear to be quite
straightforward. In reality, however, the very notion of privacy
is as challenging to define as the diversity of speech applications
where there is potential for privacy intrusion. Intrusions into
privacy can stem from the misuse of speech data for purposes
other than those to which permission may have been granted
or the processing or storage of speech data that may have been
captured without consent. Given the diversity and ubiquity of
applications that now capture, store and process speech signals,
the concept of privacy is indeed one that is difficult to define.
It is therefore perhaps not too surprising that privacy has no
formal, legal definition. Even so, regulation such as the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1] within the Euro-
pean Union implies certain restrictions and safeguards upon the
use of speech data. This situation is somewhat troubling since
the legal and technical communities do not yet share a common
understanding of what the existing regulation implies in terms
of speech data and speech technology, and of how the existing
technology is perceived and understood by legislation. The pro-
vision on and interpretation of the law depends on experts.
A common understanding will take time to evolve. This
paper is a first attempt at establishing a common understanding.
As the topic is complex, there is a need to pursue the inter-
disciplinary discussions to establish a level of harmonisation.
While presenting some reflections from both the legal and tech-
nical communities, it is not intended to be an exhaustive treat-
ment. Instead, it gently introduces some of the core issues and
implications of privacy and data protection regulation upon the
speech communication technical community and vice versa. A
set of taxonomies is proposed intended as a basis for future di-
alogue between our two communities.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a
legal perspective on the European privacy regulation. Section 3
presents a technical perspective aimed at non-experts. A set of
seven taxonomies are proposed in Section 4, whereas Section 5
presents some conclusions.
2. Privacy, a Legal Perspective
This section provides guidance concerning the interpretation of
privacy, what should be considered as biometric data as con-
cerns relevant regulation, when data should be treated as being
sensitive and the grounds for processing sensitive data.
2.1. What are ‘privacy’ and ‘data protection’?
Even though privacy is a fundamental and enforceable right in
generally all western democracies, it lacks a universal defini-
tion, even in legal provisions or in the courts. Privacy was orig-
inally defined in the US by Warren and Brandeis [2] as ‘the
right to be let alone’. This right is viewed as ‘the foundation of
individual freedom’ [3]. US scholars usually distinguish four
types of privacy: informational privacy (also known as data
privacy); physical privacy; decisional privacy, and proprietary
privacy [4]. In the EU, the right to respect for privacy has no
legal definition and ‘is a broad term not susceptible to exhaus-
tive definition’. Despite this, the right to the respect for privacy
is referenced explicitly in Art. 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights1 as well as in the Catalogue of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms in the EU in Art. 7 of the EU Charter.
The contour (delimitation) of the right to privacy is, how-
ever, defined by case law of the European Court of Human
Rights. As interpreted, private life is not restricted to the no-
tion of an inner circle, but extends to various aspects relating
to personal identity, including the right to develop relationships
with others. The right encompasses, for instance, the protec-
tion of an individual’s reputation, the protection of information
1Adopted in 1950 by the Council of Europe.
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about his/her health [5], the right to personal development and
autonomy, as well as the right to the protection of his/her per-
sonal data. Whether there is a risk of infringement or if the
right has actually been infringed, shall therefore be reviewed
case-to-case, and may become increasingly challenging in dig-
ital environments.
Extracting or processing such information without safe-
guards could possibly infringe upon the privacy of the indi-
vidual concerned, from case to case; the concept of privacy is,
moreover, interpreted by each EU nation differently within their
specification of the GDPR opening clauses. At the same time,
the use of speech data and extraction of additional information
will also fall under personal data protection. Hence, while the
recording, processing and use of speech data may or may not
violate privacy, the same will also fall under data protection
regulation, which is distinct from privacy regulation.
Both matters are strictly different, and while the fundamen-
tal right to respect for privacy is not defined, data protection
regulation in the EU consists of both a fundamental right (Art.
8 in the EU Charter) and specific, detailed rules which need to
be respected. This also applies to the use of speech in a research
environment, although exceptions to particular obligations ex-
ist, as long as the fundamental rights are respected.
2.2. When does data qualify as ‘biometric data’?
The GDPR introduces a new category of personal data: biomet-
ric data. These data are defined as ‘personal data resulting from
specific technical processing relating to the physical, physio-
logical or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which
allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person,
such as facial images or dactyloscopic data’ [1, Art. 4(14)].
2.3. When is data ‘sensitive’?
The GDPR protects the processing of ‘sensitive’ data (term used
by legal experts), which is described as including ‘personal’
data (term used by the GDPR) revealing racial or ethnic ori-
gin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs’ and
the processing of ‘biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data con-
cerning [. . . ] sex life or sexual orientation’ [1, Art. 9(1)]. The
processing of such data is prohibited, except when its process-
ing would be allowed under one of ten exceptions laid down
in the GDPR—or under an exception specified in a legislation
implementation of GDPR opening clauses by an EU nation.
The GDPR requires the entity responsible for the process-
ing (also known as the controller) to make a detailed assessment
in case processing is ‘likely to result in a high risk to the rights
and freedoms of natural persons’ [1, Art. 35]. At the same time,
the entity is required to deploy safeguards and measures to pro-
tect the rights and to implement data protection principles ‘by
design and by default’ [1, Art. 25(1)]. While remaining solely
responsible and accountable for meeting these requirements and
for the processing as a whole, these entities will need the help
of data analysis developers to understand and address the risks
involved.2 This raises the questions of who is involved at which
stages of data life cycles, how to analyse risks and employ safe-
guards? Additionally, data should be processed ‘lawfully, fairly
and in a transparent manner’, whereas processing should be ‘ad-
equate and relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation
to the purposes for which they are processed’. This is the data
minimisation principle [1, Art. 5].
2 Further guidance was provided by the Art. 29 Working Party, re-
placed by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB).
When any other personal data processing activity is likely
to result in high risks that an assessment of the risks and safe-
guards, a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) is re-
quired [1, Art. 35]. For the implementation and deployment
of data processing activities, technology researchers and devel-
opers will need to take privacy and data protection rights and
risks into account during the development process and incorpo-
rate necessary safeguards in order to preserve privacy [1, Recital
78]. Most Member States list biometric data processing as re-
quiring such a DPIA.3 The use of safeguards needs to be under-
stood in a harmonized manner, when and how the privacy im-
pact biometric data (in general, any sort of personal data) is too
riskily in application deployment. Therefore, case studies—and
moreover, a taxonomy on case studies—on how various forms
of speech applications relate to another is compulsory. For com-
municating safeguards and their implementation between tech-
nology and legal communities, a common understanding (per-
haps in the form of a taxonomy) is imperative.
2.4. What are legal grounds to process sensitive data?
Art. 9(1) of the GDPR [1] states that personal data falling into
the category of sensitive data should not be processed, unless an
exception applies as defined in Art. 9(2) of the GDPR [1]. One
of these exceptions relates to the processing of data that ‘are
manifestly made public by the data subject’ [1, Art. 9(2)(e)].
The GDPR does not define this exception, but the Article 29
Working Party, an advisory body to the European Commission
does in a non-binding opinion [6]. From that opinion, it is un-
derstood that data is manifestly made public when individuals
deliberately make their data public [6, p. 10]. This could mean
that an individual who shares his/her own data via his/her per-
sonal web site could be considered to have expressed the intent
to publicly disclose the data. An important distinction should
be made between data placed into the public domain by others
(e.g., information disclosed in a newspaper or broadcast on TV)
and data voluntarily disclosed by the individual themselves.
From a legal perspective, it is not because the data is pub-
licly available that it has been made available by the data sub-
ject. Such a distinction might well apply to speech data; many
audio/visual data can be found on the Internet , but it does not
mean that the speech data contained in these files were made
publicly available by the individuals to whom they belong.
2.5. Summary
In order to interpret the impact of risks and regulation upon
speech data, legal experts need a digestible DPIA. This is es-
sential, since a risk assessment can only be performed if it is
clear where the risk lies. For example, if speech data is solely
aimed at characterising (the biometric identity of) a speaker, all
other information, for example race or emotion, may not be rel-
evant in the processing of speech (in any form including raw,
parametrised or otherwise human/automatic annotated speech).
Any divergence from such practice would not prevent possible
‘function creep’, namely use of the same data for other pur-
poses. Safeguards to prevent such misuse should then be de-
ployed by design. In order to understand and assess the risks
of privacy intrusions, taxonomies are in high demand to facili-
tate the transparency and digestibility of concurrent speech re-
search.
3 See opinions by the EDPB on processing operations requir-
ing a DPIA, https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/
consistency-findings/opinions_en.
3. Privacy, a Technical Perspective
With a clearer picture of how privacy is characterised in terms
of legislation, we explore here the potential for speech tech-
nologies to infringe upon privacy. The treatment is intentionally
high level—it is not intended to be exhaustive. The discussion
is oriented around the legal reflections presented in Section 2.
With the aim of harmonising the work of the technical and legal
communities, we elaborate on what speech communication is
about (what is the focus of our research community?).
3.1. What is speech [in] communication?
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines speech as the
expression of or the ability to express thoughts and feelings by
articulate sounds. Communication is: 1. the act of commu-
nicating. [. . . ]; 2. the means of sending or receiving infor-
mation, such as [by] telephone lines or computers; [. . . ]. The
verb ‘to communicate’ means to share or exchange information
or ideas. Convey an (emotion or feeling) in a non-verbal way.
[. . . ]. Thus, in communications, speech is a medium to impart
or exchange information. Speech is a particularly rich source of
information, much of which is sensitive and personal.
3.2. How is speech data captured, processed and stored?
The automatic treatment of speech data generally involves:
(i) speech capture and analog-to-digital conversion; (ii) some
form of frontend processing (e.g. acoustic feature extraction,
subtraction of additive noise, deconvolution of convolutive
noise, speech enhancement and segmentation of speech/non-
speech intervals); (iii) backend processing (e.g. projection of
acoustic data to characteristic data representations, information
modeling, classification, and system output calibration).
There is a potential for privacy intrusion from the very mo-
ment of speech data capture. Sophisticated algorithms have
been designed to capture high-quality speech data from, e.g., a
single hand-held telephone microphone, multiple microphones
used in modern smartphones (allowing for noise cancellation)
and even microphone arrays (allowing for beamforming, the lo-
calisation and separation of a single, specific voice from a multi-
speaker source). Technologies can bring substantial improve-
ments to the quality of captured speech, while also resulting in
the speech of a (distant) bystander being captured unwittingly.
The form of frontend processing is usually adapted to the
task, with the acoustic features derived from such processing
forming the fundamental basis with which to suppress nuisance
variation (noise), for example, but also as means of deriving
subspace representations suitable for processing by backends.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the information that backends can
derive from speech data. The bottom row shows a time domain
representation and a spectro-temporal representation, above. It
is most commonly from this spectro-temporal representation
that the backend operates, deriving different sources and levels
of information, many of which are potentially sensitive.
3.3. Why is speech data sensitive?
In the context of voice recordings with the aim to identify the
speakers, without them knowing and without legal basis, it was
decided that such action infringed the right to privacy [7]. Lis-
tening in or recording the content of telephone and other elec-
tronic conversations is generally forbidden under communica-
tion privacy, as further elaborated in more specific communica-
tion confidentiality provisions. Since a person’s speech reflects
their biological and behavioural characteristics, speech data is
likely to qualify as sensitive data. This becomes abundantly
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Do you realise what time it is? I’m sorry, I lost track of time.
female male
Figure 1: Example of captured, processed and stored speech
(sound extracted from https://www.eslfast.com/
robot/audio/dailylife/dailylife1901.mp3).
clear when realising that many of the attributes of speech sig-
nals, e.g. those derived by the frontend described above, have
utility across a very broad of range of speech processing opera-
tions. These operations focus on the processing of both verbal
and non-verbal information, classifiable in terms of (i) linguis-
tic, (ii) paralinguistic and (iii) extralinguistic information [8, 9].
Behavioural influences stem from a person’s geographical
background, their social identity, ethnicity, socio-economic sta-
tus and other learned phenomena such as personality, emotion,
parental or familial influences and education. When combined,
physiological/biological and behavioural influences are mani-
fested as variations in the perceptual qualities of speech which
can measured in terms of correlated physical quantities. The
latter are often expressed in terms of prosody (e.g. intonation,
rhythm and stress), linguistic content (the words) and the spec-
tral envelope (the timbre or ‘colour’ of sound).
As illustrated in Figure 1, features derived by the frontend
can be used by different backends different types of sensitive,
personal information. Examples include the estimation of a
speaker’s age [10] and gender [11], for instance. The use of
biometric data for uniquely identifying a natural person can be
the goal of speaker recognition (verification/identification tech-
nology) [12, 13]. Growing interests and studies in assisted liv-
ing, ageing, medical diagnosis, emotion recognition and general
well-being, e.g. [14, 15], and a plethora of other health-related
applications are clearly within the scope of data concerning
health. That speech signals can also be used to characterise
ethnicity [16] indicates that speech data could fall under the def-
inition of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin. If a
machine can decipher spoken language, then there is no reason
why it could not also predict from the annotation of the spoken
words (and conversations) that person’s political opinions, re-
ligious or philosophical beliefs. Lastly, some research claims
that sexual preferences can also be predicted through speech
data [17]. Speech data could also fall within the scope of data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.
3.4. What safeguards are there?
A recent survey of privacy preserving safeguards for speech
data is presented in [18]. A number of different techniques
have emerged in recent times. Homomorphic encryption (HE)
[19, 20] is a form of cryptosystem designed to process speech
data in the encrypted domain, though alternative data repre-
sentations are generally required since speech data is typically
stored as floating-point data, whereas cryptosystems operate
on integer data. Garbled circuits [21] involve the splitting of
data into randomised components, each of which is then pro-
cessed by independent servers that jointly and securely com-
pute an operation upon speech data without privacy leakage.
Cancelable biometrics [22, 23] are based on model binariza-
tion, which also find use in hashing techniques [24], irreversible
but comparable speech representations. Differential privacy
techniques [25] preserve privacy by learning data representa-
tions from which information not relevant to a given appli-
cation is suppressed (e.g., information on a speaker’s identity
is removed from a representation used in speech recognition).
Finally, hardware-assisted techniques (e.g., based on the Intel
SGX architecture) [26] can complement software-based tech-
niques. Most of these techniques can be deployed as ‘addons’
to deliver privacy preservation in the case of otherwise unpro-
tected systems. Alternatively and preferably, they can be incor-
porated from the moment of system conception according to the
‘privacy by design’ principle. Somewhat orthogonal approaches
to privacy preservation include identity obfuscation/speaker de-
identification [27, 28] (for speech appearing to be of another).
4. On the Need for Taxonomies
Clearly, the legal and technical communities lack a shared un-
derstanding of the implications of the GDPR as regards speech
data. The following proposes the anchors for classification
schemes with semantic relationships (taxonomies) to facilitate
the discussion that will be needed to establish an initial level
of harmonisation. While currently lacking, it is crucial to the
preparation of DPIAs and future dialogues between the legal
and technology communities that advances in technology are
accompanied with adequate provisions for privacy preservation.
1) Information in speech merits protection: It is first nec-
essary to distinguish between the different types of informa-
tion demanding protection. Such taxonomy classes could com-
pare sensitive, personal, (legally) non-personal but protection-
worthy, and unprotectable data derivable from speech. To define
these and their relations in a digestible manner for non-experts,
communication models (e.g., [29]) may be be useful tools.
2) Capture of speech signals: The manner in which speech
is captured (single/multiple microphones), in addition to sensor
configurations and locations (distance from speakers, location,
single/multi-room) influences potential privacy intrusions (the
number of persons from whom speech is captured). Class rela-
tions could emphasise on unwittingly or consensually captured
speech (on own devices or of others).
3) Processing of speech data: Clear, understandable de-
scriptions of the purpose and interrelations between research
areas are needed so that the legal community is able to form
legislation with a view as to how it will impact upon speech
technology and privacy in speech data. The editors information
classification scheme (EDICS) may serve useful here.
4) Storage of speech data: Some level of transparency is
required concerning the means (e.g. as raw data or other rep-
resentations) and location of speech data storage (e.g. strictly
on a user’s mobile device and in the cloud; de/centralised), in
addition to access policies. Clarity will be vital to the legal com-
munity so as to identify data processors and controllers, and to
determine the potential for data to leave the EU.
5) Entities in speech data lifecycles: Who (i) creates,
(ii) integrates, (iii) operates, (iv) provides and (v) owns (sub-
)system components? Since modern speech processing systems
typically run on multi-party server infrastructures, transparency
is necessary for conducting DPIAs that outline safeguards.
6) Case studies: As a means of managing the almost
limitless variability in speech data applications (in e.g., smart
homes, health care, social media, eLearning platforms), taxon-
omy classes for use cases need defining in order to facilitate the
dialogue between legal and technical communities. Class rela-
tions might be based on if senders/recipients in communication
are peers and how information flows in their communication.
Only then can the requirements for safeguards be determined.
7) Technology safeguards: Safeguards such as encryption,
should be designed according to the specific use case and DPIA.
Safeguards can either enhance existing technology, i.e. privacy
as an addon, or as privacy by design principles and also be used
for de-identification/doxxing. Solutions can be classified ac-
cording to the attributes of the underlying techniques, e.g., cryp-
tographic technologies, security proofs, resource demands and
assumptions. Cryptographic technology is needed that facili-
tates the (real-time) demands of speech technology; applying
conventional encryption on waveforms is likely to render any
inference in speech processing computationally useless.
Even so, to satisfy strict DPIA interpretations, a legal per-
spective might demand the obfuscation/segregation of features
that could potentially describe sensitive data which is not rel-
evant to the use in a certain speech application, e.g., the use
of soft-biometric information such as ethnicity is not ultimately
necessary for speaker recognition. From a technical perspec-
tive, however, it may not be possible to meet these demands
with current capabilities, because features that reveal sensitive
data are derivable from many levels, e.g., even if acoustic fea-
tures that indicate certain accents could be segregated (inducing
artefacts lowering intelligibility), the textual representation of
uttered speech might still comprise linguistic features that re-
veal the geographical background of the speaker.
5. Conclusions
This paper summarizes the first reflections of legal and technol-
ogy communities upon the GDPR and speech data. For non-
experts, a grasp of speech as a data modality can be as chal-
lenging as achieving harmonisation between two communities
(much more so than for fingerprint or facial data). Here, har-
monising legal and speech research is challenging. The speech
community must understand the legal perspective regarding pri-
vacy legislation just as the legal community must understand the
technological implications. This common understanding will
only be achieved by reaching out to our colleagues and by col-
laborating on the preparation of policy papers (opinions); policy
papers that will eventually lead us to (better informed) legisla-
tion, and better designed products and services.
Provision and interpretation of the law, such as for the im-
plementation of privacy safeguards, need to make technology-
agnostic sense. In outlining some reflections of the legal and
technology communities, this contribution and proposed tax-
onomies is a first step in this direction. While it focuses on the
implications of the GDPR, this is certainly not the only legisla-
tion relevant to privacy in speech data. Even so, the proposed
taxonomies should also be relevant to privacy legislation out-
side of Europe. Future work should develop privacy safeguards
that encompass not only the protection of speech data obser-
vations and representations, but safeguards that are appropriate
and that account for the nature of speech as a communication
medium. Clearly, though, the dialogue between our two com-
munities must continue and are in all of our interests.
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